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Margaret M. Blair* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, 
Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery 
stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for 
the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas.1 Most likely, the board of 
directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employ-
ees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and 
staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.”2 
The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a sim-
mering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket 
chain into national news. In this era of overpaid and aloof CEOs, who 
expects employees and customers to go to bat for the CEO? 
The Demoulas clan feud provides useful context for thinking about 
the institutional mechanism for resolving disputes at the heart of corpo-
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 1. See Kristen Cloud, Market Basket Board Ousts Arthur T. Demoulas, Two Veteran Store 
Leaders, THE SHELBY REPORT (June 24, 2014), http://www.theshelbyreport.com/2014/06/24/market-
basket-board-ousts-arthur-t-demoulas-two-veteran-store-leaders/; Jane Kasperkevic, A Timeline of 
the Market Basket Supermarket Family Feud, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2014/aug/14/timeline-market-basket-
supermarket-arthur-family-feud; The Market Basket Timeline: From Ousted to Today, 
MYDEMOULAS.NET, http://www.mydemoulas.net/timeline/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). 
 2. He is known as “Arthur T.” so as not to be confused with his cousin—and nemesis—Arthur 
S. Demoulas. See Kasperkevic, supra note 1; The Market Basket Timeline, supra note 1; Casey Ross, 
Market Basket Deal Ends Bitter Feud, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2014/08/27/deal-sell-market-basket-arthur-demoulas-has-been-
signed/w9cj3I5GjanMthHzXGk11K/story.html. 
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rate law: the granting of decisionmaking authority to a board of directors. 
Most, if not all, long-term relationships do not go smoothly all the time. 
When people make a decision to live together, work together, own prop-
erty together, or build something together, they should anticipate that 
disagreements will arise, sometimes major disagreements. This is as true 
in a business endeavor as it is in other aspects of life. For this reason, 
institutional arrangements that are successful at supporting collaborative 
activities over time are likely to have some sort of dispute resolution 
mechanism, or decision rule about resolving disputes, imbedded in them. 
In this Essay, I highlight and explore the dispute resolution function of 
the corporate law requirement that corporations have boards of directors 
with “all corporate powers.”3 
It is easy to overlook the dispute resolution function of corporate 
boards. When this institution is working well, most potential disputes do 
not have to be decided by the board,4 and those disputes that do come up 
to the board are generally resolved before they become public. Therefore, 
the role boards play in this regard is mostly invisible. Moreover, the cor-
porate form is used for many other purposes in the twenty-first century, 
in addition to providing a framework for the self-governance of produc-
tive activity.5 Historically, the use of the corporate form for business ac-
tivity developed first as a mechanism to enable groups of people to com-
bine, invest, and preserve capital to provide a needed product or service 
to a community—be it churches, colleges, bridges, canals, etc.—and to 
provide a governance structure for that committed capital. Corporations 
were also formed to either establish, defend, and control trading routes, 
                                                 
 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2010) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by 
or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation . . . .”). 
 4. See infra Parts II and IV discussing how delegating decisions to an independent third party 
encourages participants in a potential dispute to moderate their demands. 
 5. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 250 n.7 (1999) (“Once this internal governance structure is in place, courts give it 
wide discretion and resist becoming involved in disputes over how the hierarchy uses its inputs and 
allocates its outputs.”); Margaret M. Blair, The Four Functions of Corporate Personhood, in 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 
440, 442 (Anna Grandori ed., 2013) (lists self-governance as one of the four key functions of corpo-
rate personhood). Corporations and similar legal entities (such as LLCs) are created often for what 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have called “asset-partitioning” purposes, however. See 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organization Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 390 (2000) (“[W]e argue that the essential role of all forms of organizational law is to provide 
for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’—that could not prac-
ticably be established otherwise.”). 
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or to colonize trading partners.6 In all of these types of activity, some sort 
of governance mechanism was required. Although research on origins of 
board governance is thin,7 it seems clear that the earliest corporations 
almost universally had boards of directors or some similar governing 
body. Why were boards needed then, and why does the law today require 
corporations to be governed by boards?8 In recent decades, the dominant 
answer to that question among legal scholars has been that boards of di-
rectors are “agents” of shareholders, whose job is to monitor manage-
ment for shareholders. 
However, team production theory of corporate law, which this 
symposium explores, argues that boards of directors serve a different 
function.9 Because boards have “all corporate powers,” but do not them-
selves own the assets being deployed in a corporation, they can serve as a 
mechanism for resolving potential disputes among the other participants 
in the corporate enterprise over the strategic direction of the firm, the use 
of corporate assets, and the allocation of the economic surplus created by 
the enterprise.10 The assignment of authority by law to the board serves 
to keep most potential disputes out of the courts, which is where many of 
them would probably end up if the underlying relationships were purely 
contractual.11 Moreover, the fact that the board of directors has the final 
                                                 
 6. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 1720–1844 (2000); Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate 
Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 785–820 (2013); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The 
Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 7. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 126–29 (2004); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The 
Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 
948 (2014); Howard Bodenhorn, Large Block Shareholders, Institutional Investors, Boards of Direc-
tors and Bank Value in the Nineteenth Century (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
w18955, Apr. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250264. 
 8. For very closely held corporations, corporate law in most states permit organizers to opt into 
an alternative governance arrangement that looks more like partnership governance, without a board 
of directors, or with a board whose power is severely limited. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 141–
146 (2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32. 
 9. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 247–328. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. To be sure, some corporate disputes wind up in court anyway, as the history of the 
Demoulas clan in Massachusetts illustrates. In 1990, the heirs of George A. Demoulas initiated two 
actions (one was a derivative action and the other a stock transfer action) against the heirs of Telem-
achus Demoulas and the entities held by Demoulas Super Markets. These actions were litigated for 
over a decade at all levels of appeal in Massachusetts state courts. See Demoulas v. Demoulas, 784 
N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). See also, e.g., Demoulas v. Demoulas, 677 N.E.2d 159 
(Mass. 1997); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 600 N.E.2d 613 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
Since the close of those actions, litigation amongst the Demoulas family has continued, most recent-
ly in an action directly between Arthur T. and Arthur S. in Demoulas v. Demoulas, No. CIV.A. 
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say in internal disputes among corporate participants encourages corpo-
rate participants to work out their disagreements among themselves to 
the extent possible.12 On a day-to-day basis, most corporate participants 
do not want to have a decision “kicked upstairs.” Therefore, it can be 
argued that the provision that “all corporate powers” are possessed by 
boards prevents many disputes from arising in the first place. 
In Part II, I briefly review the theory of team production in the eco-
nomic literature, and walk through the argument laid out by Blair and 
Stout that the institution of boards of directors in corporations fits the 
description in the economics literature of an important solution to a 
“team production” problem.13 In Part III, I discuss how the legal structure 
and duties of boards of directors ensures that most of the potentially 
highly contentious decisions that must be made in the management and 
governance of corporations will be resolved internally, without recourse 
to a court. If they cannot be resolved at a lower level, they will go to the 
board of directors and be resolved there, which means that a major task 
of boards is mediation and dispute resolution. Because the law requires 
that certain decisions must be made by the board, and that most deci-
sions, once made by the board, cannot be challenged in court, board gov-
ernance helps minimize the number of disputes that might otherwise boil 
over and require court adjudication. I argue that corporate law has tradi-
tionally supported this interpretation of what boards are supposed to be 
doing better than it supports the idea that boards are supposed to be 
agents of shareholders. In Part IV, I review new theoretical work on cor-
porate law that explores this idea, and in Part V, I review empirical find-
                                                                                                             
2013-3171A, 2013 WL 5754104 (Mass. Super. Sept. 25, 2013). But unless a potential claimant has a 
clear contract right at stake, the “business judgment rule” ensures that the judgment of the board 
cannot be challenged in court unless there is evidence of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest. See 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). It is a very interesting question as to what 
makes a dispute an “internal” one that must be decided by the board, rather than a dispute between 
the corporation and some “external” party, which might get a hearing in court. Oliver Williamson 
has defined the boundary of a firm as the line between cases a court will hear (e.g., a dispute be-
tween a senior vice president who was demoted and the corporation over terms of the employment 
contract), and cases it will not hear (e.g., a dispute between two senior vice presidents over the allo-
cation of a bonus pool). See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Anal-
ysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 274 (1991) (noting that “courts 
routinely grant standing to firms [suing other firms] should there be disputes over prices, the damag-
es to be ascribed to delays, failures of quality, and the like, [but] . . . refuse to hear disputes between 
one internal division and another over identical technical issues”); Oliver E. Williamson, Visible and 
Invisible Governance, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 325 (1994) (“[T]he (implicit) contract law of hierarchy 
is that of forbearance, according to which the internal organization becomes its own court of ultimate 
appeal.”). 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 247–328. 
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ings on boards of directors that provide support for this interpretation. In 
Part VI, I review several developments in the Delaware courts that may 
inhibit the ability of boards to carry out this function. In conclusion, I 
comment on the effect that these developments may have on how corpo-
rate boards carry out their duties. 
I.  THE TEAM PRODUCTION PROBLEM 
Early work by economists on the “theory of the firm” focused on 
the question of why people organize themselves into firms to carry out 
production activities.14 Ronald Coase posed this question in 1937 and 
hypothesized that business people would organize themselves into firms, 
in which control and decisionmaking is delegated to a managerial hierar-
chy, when the transactions costs of organizing through markets was 
higher than the transactions costs associated with production in a firm.15 
In his words, in markets, “coordination is the work of the price mecha-
nism,” while within firms, coordination is the work of the “entrepre-
neur.”16 But Coase did not offer any explanation in his article for when 
or why transactions costs would be higher in the market than they would 
be within a firm. In 1972, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz explored 
one set of circumstances in which costs would likely be high when trans-
acting in markets but potentially lower when decisionmaking is delegat-
ed to an entrepreneur or boss.17 This is the case, they said, in the context 
of “team production,” which they defined as “production in which 1) 
several types of resources are used . . . 2) the product is not a sum of sep-
arable outputs of each cooperating resource. . . . [and] 3) not all resources 
used in team production belong to one person.”18 
In the context of team production, it is extremely difficult to write 
contracts that simultaneously provide appropriate incentives for team 
members to cooperate and contribute what they are expected to contrib-
ute, and that allocate all of the output in a way that discourages team 
members from dissipating all of the gains in squabbling over the distribu-
                                                 
 14. The explanation of the team production problem in this section condenses, but follows 
closely the discussion in Part II.B of the original Blair and Stout article. See Blair & Stout, supra 
note 5, at 265–76. 
 15. R. H. COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18 
(Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991). 
 16. Id. at 20. 
 17. See Arman A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
 18. Id. at 779. 
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tion.19 If the parties attempt to agree up front to a decision rule about al-
locating the output from a team—such as every member of the team will 
receive an equal share of the total output—the team members will then 
have incentives to shirk, since their share of the output is fixed no matter 
how much they contribute. On the other hand, if they wait until the out-
put has been generated to divide up the surplus created, they will have 
incentives to squabble over that output, possibly destroying much of the 
wealth in the process. 
The Demoulas family history illustrates the problems that can arise 
out of team production. George Demoulas and Telemachus Demoulas, 
sons of the founder of the firm, ran the business together in the 1950s 
and 1960s,20 and apparently had an implicit agreement that the wealth 
generated by the firm would be split evenly between George’s family 
and Telemachus’s family.21 However, George died at a young age and 
none of his offspring joined the family business. Telemachus, on the oth-
er hand, ran the business and expanded it significantly during the decades 
after George had died.22 According to court findings in lawsuits between 
the two branches of the family, Telemachus began siphoning off some of 
the wealth being generated by the business into related firms that were 
owned only by the Telemachus branch of the family.23 Arthur T., the son 
of Telemachus, also joined the business and has been a key member of 
the management team since Telemachus died.24 Arthur T. was made 
                                                 
 19. The original Alchian and Demsetz article did not consider the question of the allocation of 
the output from the team production process, except to say that the surplus should go to the “moni-
tor” (see discussion below), but this part of the problem was introduced and modeled a few years 
later in Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982). Holmstrom re-
ferred to this part of the problem as the “budget constraint.” See discussion below. 
 20. See Kenneth J. Mickiewicz & C. Forbes Sargent, III, Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mar-
kets, Inc.: Directors’ and Shareholders’ Duty of Loyalty in Self-Dealing Transactions Involving 
Corporate Opportunity, 42 BOSTON B.J., no. 1, 1998, at 16, 16; History of Market Basket, 
MYDEMOULAS.NET, http://www.mydemoulas.net/history/ (last visited August 28, 2014). 
 21. See Meghan S. Laska & Wendy L. Pfaffenbach, Demoulas: An Inside Look at the Twists 
and Turns of a Legal Blood Feud, 28 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 2897 (2000), available at 
http://www.lawyersweekly.com/reprints/davismalm2.htm. See also Michael S. Frisch, Zealousness 
Run Amok, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1035, 1037 (2007). 
 22. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., No. CIV.A. 2013-3171A, 1995 WL 476772, 
at *5, *56, *64–65 (Mass. Super. Sept. 25, 2013); Mickiewicz & Sargent, supra note 20, at 16. 
 23. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 179–87 (Mass. 1997); 
Demoulas, 1995 WL 476772, at *1–2; Grant Welker, How One Woman Set off the Latest Chapter in 
the Market Basket Tale, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE (July 27, 2014), http://www.sentinelandenterprise 
.com/news/ci_26225290/how-one-woman-set-off-latest-chapter-market. 
 24. See Casey Ross, Market Basket CEO Faces Revolt Led by His Cousin, BOSTON GLOBE 
(July 12, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/11/latest-market-basket-battle-ceo-
faces-revolt-led-his-cousin/GGvTeDG067xE5LKmFjWMRM/story.html (“Market Basket has 
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CEO in 2008, and by the summer of 2014 had worked in the business in 
one capacity or another for more than 40 years.25 
The tensions between the two branches of the family are, undoubt-
edly, about a lot of things, but without having access to nonpublic infor-
mation, one likely source of tension seems obvious: Arthur S. and his 
siblings (George’s offspring) think they deserve half of the value of the 
Market Basket business because their father was an equal partner in the 
business (the ex ante sharing rule was fixed at 50/50), while Arthur T. 
and his siblings think they deserve more than half of the value of the 
business because their father, and Arthur T. himself, worked for years in 
the business without any help from the other side of the family. The Te-
lemachus side, it seems, has contributed substantial human capital as 
well as financial wealth.26 This case also illustrates that ex post squab-
bling can be extremely destructive—some observers of the grocery in-
dustry have estimated that the dispute cost the Demoulas family as much 
as $10 million per day while the stores remained closed or disrupted.27 
Alchian and Demsetz, in their classic article, used a much more 
prosaic example of a team production problem than that presented by the 
Demoulas family feud—the effort by two movers to load cargo into a 
truck. In their example, neither member of the team can do the job by 
himself, but it is very hard to specify in advance precisely what each 
mover is supposed to do, and very difficult to measure, even as they are 
carrying out the task, which person is contributing what.28 “With team 
production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either define 
or determine each individual’s contribution to this output of the cooperat-
ing inputs. The output . . . is not a sum of separable outputs of each of its 
members,” they explained.29 Alchian and Demsetz suggested that the 
                                                                                                             
grown and prospered during his five-year tenure as boss: opening 12 stores and renovating another 
11 . . . .”). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Mickiewicz & Sargent, supra note 20, at 16 (“At all relevant times after George’s 
death, the boards of directors of DSM and Valley were controlled by members of Telemachus’ fami-
ly or directors who had a business or financial relationship with Telemachus or stood to personally 
benefit from the transactions voted upon by the boards.”). 
 27. See Casey Ross & Jack Newsham, Pressure Mounts on Market Basket Board of Directors, 
BOSTON GLOBE (July 28, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/07/28/the-state-
market-basket/dDBOJigFgrmrNhsDcwJ94M/story.html (“Industry specialists have estimated the 
crisis is costing the company more than $10 million a day in lost business and inventory.”). The two 
sides reached an agreement on August 27, 2014, after which thousands of Market Basket employees 
returned to work to get the stores stocked and opened again. Casey Ross, Market Basket Deal Ends 
Bitter Feud, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2014/08/27/deal-sell-
market-basket-arthur-demoulas-has-been-signed/w9cj3I5GjanMthHzXGk11K/story.html. 
 28. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 17, at 779. 
 29. Id. 
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solution to such a team production problem is for someone to specialize 
as a “monitor” and, to make sure that the monitor doesn’t shirk, the mon-
itor should be awarded the net revenue of the team, over and above the 
cost of paying the other team members according to their opportunity 
cost.30 Alchian and Demsetz’s solution, therefore, may explain why 
business people form individual proprietorships, in which one person 
owns the assets used in production, hires other labor inputs, and monitors 
the activity of those inputs. But Alchian and Demsetz did not consider 
how their solution would be affected if team members have to make 
some sort of team-specific investment in the enterprise, and they asserted 
that there is no role or purpose in their model for long-term relationships 
among team members.31 The Alchian and Demsetz model is a helpful 
start in thinking about a more general theory of the firm, but it does not 
provide an explanation of large, publicly traded corporations, in which 
share ownership is separated from control, and the employer–
employment relationship is generally quite long-term. 
Using a different approach, Bengt Holmstrom, writing in 1982, re-
visited the problem of team production.32 Holmstrom asked: what hap-
pens if the activities of the team member are difficult to measure, even 
for a full-time monitor? And what if the productivity of individual team 
members is interactive, in the sense that each team member’s actions 
affect not only her own productivity, but that of her other team members 
as well? Would it be possible for an entrepreneur to solve this problem 
with contracts? Could the entrepreneur write an employment contract 
with each team member that would provide appropriate incentives for 
each team member to work hard, cooperate, and not shirk, while also 
satisfying a “budget constraint?”33 In particular, the budget constraint 
requires that all of the joint output, and no more, is distributed to the 
team members. Holmstrom developed a mathematical model of this 
problem and concluded that it is mathematically impossible to write a 
contract that provides the right incentives to all members of the team, 
while distributing all of the surplus—no more and no less—to the team 
members.34 To solve the problem, someone must play the role of a 
                                                 
 30. Id. at 781–82. If team members are paid their opportunity cost out of the revenue generated 
by the business, the net revenue would be equal to the total new value created by the efforts of the 
team. 
 31. Id. at 783 (“The employee can terminate the contract as readily as can the employer, and 
long term contracts, therefore, are not an essential attribute of the firm.”). 
 32. See Holmstrom, supra note 19. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 326. To provide the “right incentives”—incentives that lead to the most efficient 
choices of effort and output by each team member—each team member would need to be paid his or 
 
2015] Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs 305 
“budget breaker.”35 Like a monitor, a budget breaker is an outsider to the 
team production process, but the role of the budget breaker is to passive-
ly pay out surpluses to team members when the surplus is high, but ab-
sorb the surpluses when total surplus is lower than the optimal level.36 
Team members would then be paid according to the following scheme: If 
the team as a whole achieves some target level of output—a level that 
can only be reached if no one shirks—then the surplus generated by team 
production will be divided equally among all the active team members, 
not including the budget breaker.37 If the team fails to achieve the target 
level, this implies that at least one member of the team shirked. In such a 
case, all of the team members would be punished, and paid only their 
marginal opportunity cost, without sharing in the surplus. This is the only 
way to be sure that each team member bears the full cost of her own 
shirking. In this case, whatever surplus was created (which is less than 
the target amount), must then not be distributed to the team, but should 
go to the budget breaker.38 
One problem with this solution, however, is that a purely passive 
budget breaker would have a significant incentive not to stay passive, but 
rather would try to bribe a member of the team to shirk just a little, so 
that output falls just short of the target level of output, and the budget 
breaker would then capture the surplus that is created.39 
Gary Miller has argued that Holmstrom’s insight that a budget 
breaker is needed, combined with the Eswaran and Kotwal critique about 
the incentives of the budget breaker, imply that, for Holmstrom’s solu-
                                                                                                             
her individual marginal product. But in a team production situation, the marginal product is a team 
product, not just an individual product. It is not mathematically possible to pay every team member 
the marginal team product of his or her individual input. This conclusion has sometimes been called 
“Holmstrom’s impossibility result.” See, e.g., Gary Miller, Why Is Trust Necessary in Organiza-
tions? The Moral Hazard of Profit Maximization, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 314 (Karen Cook ed., 2001). 
Miller states the “result” as simply “that there is no way to allocate the earnings of the team that is 
simultaneously budget-balancing, Pareto-optimal, and a Nash equilibrium. . . . [B]udget balancing 
makes every team production problem an N-person prisoners’ dilemma game.” Id (emphasis in 
original). 
 35. Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 325 (“Thus, the principal’s primary role is to break the budg-
et-balancing constraint.”). 
 36. Id. at 327–28 (“The enforcement problem can be overcome only by bringing in a principal 
(or a party) who will assume the residual of the nonbudget balancing sharing rules.”); Miller, supra 
note 34, at 311 (refers to the budget breaker as a “sponge”). 
 37. The division does not have to be equal, but it simplifies the discussion to tell the story this 
way. 
 38. Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 327. 
 39. Id. Holmstrom acknowledges this problem in passing but does not explore it. Id. Eswaran 
and Kotwal were the first to fully discuss this troubling implication of the Holmstrom solution to the 
team production problem. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, The Moral Hazard of Budget-
Breaking, 15 RAND J. ECON. 578, 578–81 (1984). 
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tion to work, the budget breaker must be completely passive.40 If the 
budget breaker can play any kind of active role, then team members will 
have to take into account the incentives that the budget breaker has to 
bribe one of the team members to prevent the optimal output from being 
achieved. I will return to this point below. 
Oliver Hart, together with various coauthors, has also studied the 
team production problem, although he does not use that phrase to de-
scribe the problem he models.41 Hart, together with Grossman, considers 
the organizational problems that arise when two or more parties must all 
make highly specific investments, say in specialized skills required to 
use a unique type of equipment or software program.42 Hart points out 
that (as in team production) it is difficult or impossible to write complete 
contracts to govern the participants in such a project.43 Consequently, he 
argues, there is a role for property rights in this situation, noting that 
property rights give the “owner” of an asset the right to make decisions 
about the uses of the asset other than those decisions and activities that 
have been contracted away.44 This solves the incomplete contracting 
problem because it allows the parties who are participating in a joint pro-
duction activity to commit to what they can in a contract, while giving 
the “owner” of the specific assets used in production the right to make 
the “residual” decisions about the use of the assets in any contingency 
that has not been provided for in the contract.45 The “owner” thus has a 
bargaining advantage in dividing up any surplus from the team produc-
tion activity, which ensures the owner that investments she makes in spe-
cialized human capital cannot be expropriated by the other team mem-
                                                 
 40. Eswaran & Kotwal, supra note 39, at 579 (“A crucial assumption that is implicit in 
Holmstrom’s proposal is that the principal cannot make covert side contracts with one of the agents. 
Since the principal’s payoff is discretely greater when the team output falls marginally short of the 
Pareto optimal level than when it does not, he actually prefers the agents to shirk.” (emphasis in 
original)); Miller, supra note 34, at 311 (“Someone with no active role in the team’s production 
efforts must absorb residual costs and benefits.” (emphasis in original)). 
 41. Hart emphasizes the incompleteness of contracts, and does not limit his work to contracting 
problems that arise because of team production. But most of the scenarios he lays out can be ana-
lyzed as team production problems.  See, e.g., Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory 
of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988). 
 42. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986) (noting that the difficulty of 
writing complete contracts arises “when either the buyer or seller must make investments that have a 
smaller value in a use outside their own relationship than within the relationship (i.e., there exist 
‘asset specificities’)”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., id.; Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the 
Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
 45. Property rights thus serve as a dispute resolution—or dispute prevention—mechanism. 
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bers. Therefore, Hart’s solution to the team production problem is to 
grant property rights over the specific assets used in production to the 
team member whose investments in specialized human capital are most 
important to the project. Hart then defines a “firm” as the set of assets 
under common ownership.46 
Hart’s solution provides substantial insight into the role of property 
rights in firms, but it only allows for one owner. If more than one mem-
ber of the team must make specific investments for the team to achieve 
its efficient level of productivity, this solution may not work. More im-
portantly for our consideration of corporate law, this solution cannot ex-
plain the modern business corporation, in which “ownership” of the as-
sets used in production is separated from control over the use of those 
assets. 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales build on Hart’s model.47 They 
first observe that Hart’s model assumes that there will be a single team 
member whose investment in team-specific assets is most important to 
the team. But unless specific investments of all other team members are 
not important, assigning property rights to one team member does not 
solve the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the other team 
members. Rajan and Zingales also note that asset “ownership” normally 
includes the right to sell (or “redeploy”) the asset, as well as the right to 
make the residual decisions about its use.48 When the right to sell is taken 
into account, they observe that there might be situations in which an 
owner can make more money by selling the asset, thereby capturing 
some of the value of specific investments made by other team members, 
than she can make by investing in her own specialized human capital.49 
The solution they arrive at is similar to Holmstrom’s solution, which is to 
give control rights (but, they argue, not the right to possess or sell) over 
the specialized assets in the business to an outsider to the team.50 The 
outsider would have hiring and firing authority, thereby controlling who 
is on the team, and his job would be to allow teams to compete with each 
                                                 
 46. Grossman & Hart, supra note 42, at 693 (defining a firm as “those assets that it owns or 
over which it has control”). 
 47. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 
(1998). 
 48. Id. at 408 (“The owner can extract a greater share of the surplus ex post . . . by wielding the 
out-of-equilibrium threat of leaving the relationship and taking the assets with him.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 422 (“[I]f all parties involved in production (i.e., including the entrepreneur) have to 
make substantial specific investments over time, it may be optimal for a completely unrelated third 
party to own the assets. . . . [T]he third party holds power so that the agents critical to production do 
not use the power of ownership against each other.”). 
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other for the right to use the specialized asset, and to grant that right to 
the team that is able to deliver the highest total output from the project.51 
The outsider could be compensated by granting him a tiny fraction of the 
output, which gives him a reason to choose the most productive team. 
Holmstrom, Miller, and Rajan and Zingales all suggest that their 
models of the team production problem help explain key features of pub-
licly traded corporations. In particular, they suggest that the role of the 
outside budget breaker in Holmstrom’s and Miller’s work, or the role of 
the outside decider in Rajan and Zingales’s work, in their models helps 
explain why we see absent and largely passive shareholders in modern 
corporations.52 Holmstrom argues that a passive “owner” (who does not 
also “control” the firm), can provide the right incentives to active team 
members by retaining the surplus in low performance years and paying 
out the surplus as bonuses in high performance years.53 Rajan and 
Zingales claim that having a player whose job is to decide which team to 
hire, but who does not have the other rights and duties of ownership, 
helps explain the role of outside, largely passive shareholders.54 Miller 
asserts that passive shareholders fulfill the role of budget breaker by 
“passively absorbing residual profits or losses.”55 
Blair and Stout pick up where Rajan and Zingales leave off. They 
note first that the role for an outsider described by Rajan and Zingales 
does not look like the role of outside shareholders in real corporations.56 
Outside shareholders in a publicly traded corporation are not typically 
involved—at least not directly—in choosing the members of the active 
team.57 Nor do they play a role in real corporations that remotely resem-
bles the role of either Holmstrom’s budget breaker or Miller’s “residual 
owner.” Whereas the budget breaker in the Holmstrom model captures 
the surplus when productivity is low, not when it is high, the reverse is 
more typically the case for shareholders—dividends are high when a 
corporation is especially productive and low when productivity is low. 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 325; Miller, supra note 34, at 314; Rajan & Zingales, 
supra note 47, at 423. 
 53. Holmstrom, supra note 19, at 325. 
 54. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 47, at 422–23. 
 55. Miller, supra note 34, at 312–13. 
 56. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 274 n.57 (“Rajan and Zingales interpret their story as 
providing a rationale for the separation of share ownership in a corporation from labor in-
puts. . . . This seems like an odd interpretation, however, because the third party ‘owner’ in the Rajan 
and Zingales model is not a residual claimant.”). 
 57. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 47, at 422 (noting that the “third party” decider in their mod-
el has the power of “hiring, firing, and controlling the sale of assets”). 
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Blair and Stout observe that the participants in actual corporations 
whose role conforms most closely to the outside decider in these models 
is the board of directors, especially the “outside” or “independent” direc-
tors.58 Directors, when acting as a body, have almost complete control 
over the assets used in production, plus hiring and firing rights, but they 
do not themselves own the assets of the firm. They are not part of the 
regular “team” in that they do not typically get involved in day-to-day 
activities and decisions.59 They also typically do not personally make 
much in the way of human capital investments that are specific to the 
corporation. Thus, directors can play a role that is similar to the role of 
the outside decider in the Rajan and Zingales model. 
Directors do not play the role of the outside budget breaker de-
scribed in Holmstrom’s and Miller’s articles, however. They do not ab-
sorb the surplus production when output falls short of the most efficient 
level of production, nor do they pay the surplus to team members when 
productivity is high enough. But there is a party that does play this role 
in the publicly traded corporation. It is the corporation itself, the separate 
legal entity that, because it is an artificial person and not a flesh-and-
blood person, can be the completely passive holder of surpluses created 
by the team, at least until the surplus is high enough that the board of 
directors can decide to pay some of it out in the form of higher dividends 
and higher salaries to the active team members.60 Building on Holmstrom 
and Miller, Blair and Stout suggest that the corporation itself is the pure-
ly passive counterparty to all transactions in which surpluses generated 
by the team are either paid out to team members, or withheld and re-
tained in the corporate coffers.61 And building on Rajan and Zingales, the 
board of directors is the party that has the right (and the responsibility) to 
decide the allocation of duties and benefits among competing interests 
within the corporation. The latter role is what we have called the role of 
“mediating hierarch.” 
                                                 
 58. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 277. 
 59. With the exception, of course, that CEOs, who also serve on boards, are actively involved 
and responsible for the day-to-day activities of the firm. 
 60. Roland Kirstein and Robert D. Cooter explore in detail the idea that the firm itself can play 
the role of “External Anti-Sharer,” which is almost identical to the role played by Holmstrom’s 
“Budget Breaker.” See Roland Kirstein & Robert D. Cooter, Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partner-
ships and Firms (Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 294, 2006). 
 61. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 269 (“[W]e argue that shareholders, executives, and em-
ployees are all team members, and that the budget breaker is the corporation itself—the fictional 
entity that, under the law, holds title to the firm’s assets and serves as the repository for all its resid-
ual returns until they are paid out to shareholders or other stakeholders.” (emphasis in original)). 
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II. HOW CORPORATE LAW ASSIGNS DIRECTORS TO THE ROLE OF 
MEDIATING HIERARCHS 
One of the major benefits of organizing production through a cor-
poration is that the corporation itself has standing as a separate legal enti-
ty that is allowed to own property—separate from management, from 
shareholders, and from board members or other participants. Assets used 
jointly by all of the team members can thus be held by the corporation—
the separate entity. In this way, none of the active team members own the 
assets, so they cannot unilaterally pull assets out of the enterprise or oth-
erwise compel the corporation to buy out their interests. For this reason, 
they cannot use a threat to withdraw assets to extract a higher share of 
the economic rents generated in the business from the other team mem-
bers. 
In related work, I have discussed the economic benefits that come 
from the fact that capital invested in corporations is essentially “locked 
in,” at least until the board of directors decides to pay some of it out.62 
The ability to lock in the assets invested in a corporation makes it possi-
ble for the corporation to undertake production activities that require 
large amounts of highly specific and long-lived assets, such as railroad 
tracks. However, it also means that investors in equity shares, if they de-
cide they want to get out of that investment, cannot just compel the cor-
poration to buy them out. This is another painful lesson of the story of 
the Demoulas family and Market Basket grocery stores. If Arthur T. and 
Arthur S. were partners in a common law partnership, rather than share-
holders in a corporation, Arthur S. could get out of the business if he 
were unhappy simply by announcing that he wants to disassociate. This 
would compel Arthur T. to either to buy out Arthur S.’s share of the val-
ue of the business, or liquidate the business in order to distribute Arthur 
S.’s share of the business to him. Since they may not be able to get out of 
an investment in a corporation that easily (especially if there is no market 
for the shares of the corporation), participants in corporations need 
mechanisms for resolving disputes. The team production theory of corpo-
rate law hypothesizes that the institutional arrangement provided by law 
for settling many of the disputes that arise in the course of carrying out a 
business activity through a corporation is governance by a board of di-
rectors. If the parties directly involved in any internal dispute cannot 
reach a resolution themselves, directors are authorized to decide the is-
sue, and for the most part, their decisions cannot be challenged in court. 
                                                 
 62. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 387–455 (2003). 
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In this way, directors play a role that is similar to the role of the outside 
decider in the Rajan and Zingales model. 
A number of important features of corporate law support the idea 
that directors are expected to be the final decisionmakers with respect to 
decisions that are inherently likely to be highly conflictual. These issues 
include (1) the hiring or firing of a CEO;63 (2) compensation of the 
CEO;64 (3) compensation of the board itself;65 (4) succession planning;66 
(5) declaring and paying dividends;67 (6) developing a plan for a merger 
or acquisition,68 or for a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a 
corporation;69 (7) dissolution of the company;70 (8) issuing new stock;71 
(9) reviewing and approving any transaction in which the CEO or a 
board member has a conflict of interest;72 (10) responding to a derivative 
action initiated by a shareholder;73 and (11) selecting an auditor and ap-
proving the audit.74 
In all of these matters, key constituencies in the corporation will 
likely have interests that conflict with each other. Shareholders and 
creditors may not agree, for example, about how large a dividend the 
corporation can safely pay out and still have plenty of cash to pay debt 
obligations. A dissident shareholder may have a very different idea about 
who should be the next CEO than that of the internal management team. 
There may be disputes within the internal management team over succes-
sion, or over compensation packages and bonuses. Common shareholders 
may have very different views about whether a corporation should issue 
new shares, and what the characteristics of those shares should be, than 
the founders have.75 In the world of venture capital firms, it is well 
                                                 
 63. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(b) (2002). 
 64. Id. § 8.01(c)(iii). 
 65. Id. § 8.11. 
 66. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, at 28 (2012), 
available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/BRT_Principles_of_Corporate_ 
Governance_-2012_Formatted_Final.pdf. 
 67. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2002). 
 68. Id. § 11.40(a). 
 69. Id. § 12.02(b). 
 70. Id. § 14.02(b). 
 71. Id. § 6.21(b). 
 72. Id. § 8.61(b); and §8.62. 
 73. Id. § 7.44. 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2014). 
 75. For example, when Google underwent a stock split in April 2014, each share of Class A 
Stock (Google’s publically traded common stock) was split into two shares: one share of Class A 
stock and one share of Class C stock, a newly created category of nonvoting stock. The founders of 
Google structured this split in order to avoid dilution of their control of the company, a move that 
was criticized by proponents of shareholder primacy.  Moreover, some large shareholders filed class-
action lawsuits seeking to block the split, which resulted in Google making several concessions. See, 
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known that there are likely to be disagreements between holders of 
common shares and holders of preferred shares about when the firm 
should sell itself and merge with another firm.76 And, as the Market Bas-
ket brouhaha illustrates, employees and customers may even have prefer-
ences about who should be CEO that are different from what some dom-
inant faction of shareholders would prefer. 
To be sure, some constituencies—the CEO, or top management 
team, or prominent activist shareholders—may well have significant in-
put into the conversation or debate among board members about a key 
decision. But in every case, the board of directors, acting as a body, must 
ultimately make the call. The fiduciary duties of directors address the 
question of how the board must go about arriving at a decision77 and, for 
some types of questions, the law has outlined in very general terms what 
factors the board should consider in making the decision.78 But irrespec-
tive of how directors proceed, the decision is theirs to make. Corporate 
law in the United States requires that decisions such as these are the re-
sponsibility of the board. And if board members (or an independent sub-
                                                                                                             
e.g., Michael Liedtke, An Explanation of Google’s Confusing Stock Split, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_25468991/an-explanation-googles-
confusing-stock-split; Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter 
Control, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-
gives-google-founders-tighter-control/. As of August 28, 2014, the Class A shares were trading at a 
2% premium above the Class C nonvoting shares. 
 76. This was the issue behind the recent decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in In re 
Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 17 A.3d 17, 36–38 (Del. Ch. 2013). See infra Part IV for 
discussion of this problem. 
 77. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding that in order for 
directors to satisfy their duty of care, directors must “inform[] themselves prior to making a business 
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them” (internal quotations omitted)); see 
also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 60–62 (Del. 2006) (holding that directors 
were “fully informed of all material facts” when hiring a new CEO by knowing the key terms of the 
employment agreement, understanding the CEO’s experience and skills, and asking pertinent ques-
tions during the hiring process); cf. In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 19028, 
2003 WL 139768, at *12 (Del Ch. Jan. 10, 2003) (explaining that the decisionmaking process of 
directors is actionable only if “grossly negligent”). 
 78. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376–77 (Del. 1995) (explaining 
that in the context of a hostile tender offer, directors must balance the long-term business valuation 
of the company against potential immediate monetary gains to shareholders); see also Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that after the board 
has decided to sell the company, the directors’ duties change from preserving the “corporate entity to 
the maximization of the company’s value . . . for the stockholders’ benefit”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (stating that the board should consider “the nature of the 
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. . . . [including the] inadequacy of the price 
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other 
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community general-
ly)”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that directors owe sharehold-
ers an “uncompromising duty of loyalty” during their decisionmaking process). 
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set of them, or a formal committee) make the decision in good faith, with 
the best interests of the corporation in mind, courts will very rarely over-
turn the decision that the board made.79 In fact, once these decisions have 
been made by the board, any attempt to challenge them in a court will 
probably not get past a motion to dismiss, unless the plaintiffs can show 
evidence of “fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest” on the part of the 
board.80 
The dominant paradigm in corporate law and corporate governance 
in recent decades asserts that directors are supposed to act as agents for 
shareholders, so that, when making decisions in any of the situations 
identified above, they are supposed to choose the path that maximizes 
share value. But very few issues present themselves as a clear choice be-
tween path A, which maximizes share value, and path B, which does not. 
In a complex business environment, directors must inevitably consider 
the various competing ideas and interests at stake, and make judgment 
calls and tradeoffs. The business judgment rule ensures that directors’ 
decisions in these matters, even if they turn out badly, will not be over-
turned by courts, absent some sort of self-dealing, misconduct, or bad 
faith by the board.81 The decision by the board of directors of Market 
Basket to force Arthur T. out of the CEO job, for example, was probably 
not a decision that could be challenged in court, unless Arthur T. could 
                                                 
 79. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928) (“The response which 
courts make to such applications is that it is not their function to resolve for corporations questions 
of policy and business management.  The directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and their 
judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final.” (emphasis in original)); Gries 
Sports Enters. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963–64 (Ohio 1986) (“[The busi-
ness judgment rule is] a rebuttable presumption that directors are better equipped than the courts to 
make business judgments and that the directors acted without self-dealing or personal interest and 
exercised reasonable diligence and acted with good faith.”); In Trados, the Delaware Chancery 
Court made it abundantly clear that it believes that the best interest of the corporation means the best 
interest of common shareholders. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 17 A.3d 17, 36–38 
(Del. Ch. 2013); see also infra Part V and related discussion. But unless the decision by the board 
blatantly disregards the interests of the common shareholder, as was the case in Trados where the 
board was controlled by preferred shareholders, it is highly unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to 
make a case that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in making a decision in which there 
was no fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest. 
 80. Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). In Trados, the court found that 
the six of the seven directors had conflicts of interest, so it applied the entire fairness standard, rather 
than the business judgment rule. Trados II, 73 A.3d 17, at 45. The Delaware Chancery Court in eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark appears to have established a somewhat different decision rule 
for whether a board’s decision will be given deference under the business judgment rule. eBay Do-
mestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). The requirement in this case was that 
the plaintiff show that a “majority of the directors who approved the action (1) had a personal inter-
est in the subject matter of the action, (2) were not fully informed in approving the action, or (3) did 
not act in good faith in approving the action.” Id. at 36. 
 81. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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show that board members committed fraud or had inappropriate motives, 
such as that a majority of the board was so controlled by, and accounta-
ble to, Arthur S. that their ability to act in the best interest of the corpora-
tion was compromised. 82 
If Market Basket were a publicly traded corporation, dissatisfied 
family shareholders on one side or the other of the Demoulas family bat-
tle would probably have simply sold their shares and gotten out of the 
business some time ago. In a closely held business, however, sharehold-
ers can be locked in because there is no market in which to sell their 
shares. In this context, it is worth noting that, if a board comes to be to-
tally controlled by a faction that owns a majority of the shares of the cor-
poration (thus making it impossible for a dissatisfied minority sharehold-
er to replace the board, or have their interests taken into account), and the 
board causes the corporation to take actions that defeat the reasonable 
expectations of the minority to share in the benefits of the corporation, 
courts do provide another remedy—a suit for equitable relief on the 
grounds of shareholder oppression.83 
Because the law requires that certain decisions must be made by the 
board, and that most decisions, once made by the board, cannot be chal-
lenged in court, board governance helps minimize the number of disputes 
that might otherwise boil over and require court adjudication. The struc-
ture of corporate law thus supports the idea that boards must be “mediat-
                                                 
 82. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Clean-Up Still Needed on Aisle Five: Massachusetts Gov. 
Deval Patrick Offers Sage Advice to Protesting Workers, Which of Course Is Promptly Rejected, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/holman-jenkins-clean-up-still-needed-
on-aisle-five-1408140579?KEYWORDS=demoulas; Ross, supra note 2. If a board is controlled by 
one party in an internal dispute, it is unlikely that the other party will trust the board to make a fair 
decision. I will come back to this point later. 
 83. Litle v. Waters, Civ. A. No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) (defining 
minority shareholder oppression as a “violation of the reasonable expectations of the minority” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (defining 
oppressive conduct). See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet 
to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 
923 (1999) (explaining that the “core protection against majority oppression is the prohibition on 
non pro rata distributions [to shareholders] and the related prohibitions on self-dealing”); Robert B. 
Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993) (explain-
ing circumstances in which oppression remedy is available). Technically, Delaware does not recog-
nize minority oppression as grounds for equitable relief, but it does offer relief to minority share-
holders under other causes of action by applying other legal principles. In fact, Delaware cases that 
have consistently stated that directors must run corporations for the benefit of shareholders, and not 
for the benefit of other corporate constituents, have stated this rule in the context of situations in 
which a minority shareholder is being deprived much of the benefit of being a shareholder by actions 
of majority shareholders. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
279 (1998) (“The shareholder primacy norm was first used by courts to resolve disputes among 
majority and minority shareholders in closely held corporations.”). 
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ing hierarchs” better than it supports that boards are supposed to be 
“agents” of shareholders, who focus exclusively on maximizing share 
value. Moreover, the lessons of Holmstrom, Miller, Rajan and Zingales, 
and Blair and Stout, suggest that, for this mechanism to work well, the 
board should not be so controlled by any of the team members that the 
other important team members cannot trust that the decisions made by 
the board will be in the best interest of the corporation as a whole. 
III. NEW THEORETICAL WORK THAT SUPPORTS THE IDEA THAT 
DIRECTORS SHOULD BE MEDIATING HIERARCHS 
There is a certain irony in the way that scholarship and doctrine 
about the duties of boards of directors has evolved. Throughout the mid-
dle of the twentieth century through at least the 1970s, most scholars of 
corporate law, as well as legal and business practitioners, accepted and 
were comfortable with the idea that boards of directors have to play a 
balancing role.84 Corporations were recognized as having substantial im-
pact on many constituencies in the economy and in society, and pro-
nouncements about the duties of corporate managers and directors re-
flected the idea that the leaders of large business corporations had an ob-
ligation to take these broad social impacts into account. For example, as 
late as 1981, Business Roundtable, under the leadership of Clifton C. 
Garvin, CEO of Exxon from 1975 to 1986, published a “Statement on 
Corporate Responsibility” that said corporate executives must balance 
the interests of various constituents: 
Carefully weighing the impacts of decisions and balancing different 
constituent interests—in the context of both near-term and long-
term effects—must be an integral part of the corporation’s decision-
making and management process. Resolving the differences in-
volves compromises and trade-offs. It is important that all sides be 
heard but impossible to assure that all will be satisfied because 
competing claims may be mutually exclusive.85 
Similarly, a United States Department of Commerce report pub-
lished in 1980 quoted Reginald Jones, former chairman and chief execu-
tive officer of General Electric, as expressing a similar sentiment: 
“[P]ublic policy and social issues are no longer adjuncts to business 
planning and management, they are in the mainstream of it. The concern 
                                                 
 84. See generally Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal 
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 305 (2013) (pages 326–31 provide an extended discussion of this point). 
 85. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 8 (1981). 
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must be pervasive in companies today, from boardroom to factory floor. 
Management must be measured for performance in noneconomic and 
economic areas alike.”86  
In the 1980s, however, corporate law scholarship began to reflect a 
finance perspective on the role of corporate officers and directors in the 
form of principal–agent analysis. Legal scholars borrowed themes from 
Milton Friedman,87 Jensen and Meckling,88 and other finance theorists89 
to embrace the idea that the fundamental problem in the governance of 
corporations is the separation of ownership from control. This separation 
supposedly creates significant difficulties for the ability of the “owners” 
(shareholders) to be sure that the managers are faithfully carrying out 
their duties. Scholars reasoned that, if this is the central problem, then the 
function of corporate law must be to provide a solution to that problem; 
thus scholars began analyzing corporate law issues within a framework 
of principal–agent theory.90 Part of the solution, some theorists argued, 
must be that directors and managers of corporations have a legal duty to 
try to maximize the value of corporations for their “owners,” the com-
                                                 
 86. U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980S, at 75 
(1980). 
 87. Friedman wrote that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it . . . engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.” Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, available at 
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM (1962)). 
 88. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 89. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & 
ECON. 301 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965). The concern about the separation of ownership and control dates back at least to 
ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). 
 90. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano ed., 1993); Victor 
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1403 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of A Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 863 (1991). 
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mon shareholders,91 and that shareholders should have significant legal 
tools to make sure that directors and managers do this.92 
Now, thirty-five years after the language of share value maximiza-
tion began to dominate discussions of corporate governance, corporate 
law—in the form of decisions from the Delaware courts—appears to be 
evolving in the direction suggested by finance theorists in the 1970s and 
1980s, by requiring boards of directors to focus on maximizing value for 
common shareholders, at least in certain contexts.93 Now, however, fi-
nance theorists are increasingly rejecting the idea that maximizing the 
value for holders of common shares necessarily produces the socially 
optimal outcome. 
There are a variety of situations explored in finance literature that 
are beginning to be studied by law and finance scholars, wherein a sim-
ple rule—that boards of directors should choose actions to maximize 
share value—would not lead to the most efficient or socially optimal 
long-term outcome. These include: First, situations of substantial infor-
mation asymmetry, in which shareholders or other investors do not have 
full information about the sources of long-term value in the firm. As a 
result, they may prefer that the firm take actions such as a merger or 
share repurchase that seem to offer a higher value to shareholders in the 
short run, but may weaken or destroy the ability of the firm to deliver 
long-term value.94 Widespread concerns about whether corporate manag-
                                                 
 91. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 
395 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Share-
holders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 23 
(1991). 
 92. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833 (2005). See also Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of A Target’s Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, supra note 90. 
 93. See discussion infra of eBay and Trados in Part V. See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 
695, 706 (Del. 2009) (holding that “enhancing the corporation’s long term share value” is a “distinc-
tively corporate concern”). For most of the last thirty years or so, it has been credible to argue that 
corporate law in Delaware paid lip-service to the idea that managers and boards should run corpora-
tions in the interest of common shareholders, but the business judgment rule provided almost com-
plete protection to directors who chose actions that protected and advanced the interests of other 
corporate constituencies, if directors asserted that those actions would create value for shareholders 
in the long run. See, for example, Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 733–869 (2005), who makes a powerful case that neither Delaware law, nor 
the corporate law of any other state, require that corporate boards must maximize share value. Re-
cent decisions out of the Delaware Court, however, suggest that directors who take into account the 
impact of corporate decisions on other stakeholders, including preferred shareholders, run some risk 
of being found in breach of their fiduciary duties unless they can show that their decisions were in 
the best long-run interest of the common shareholders. See discussion infra. 
 94. See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND 
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
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ers are pressured—by powerful stock-based incentive compensation 
packages, shareholder activism, concerns about legal liability, or all 
three—to sacrifice long-term value creation in order to push share prices 
up in the short run are responses to the problem of information asym-
metry.95 Second, situations in which share value can be enhanced by ac-
tions that have the effect of expropriating value from other corporate par-
ticipants by breaching implicit contracts.96 And third, situations in which 
the interests of various investor groups conflict which each other. For 
example, holders of one class of stock can benefit from risky strategies 
that destroy or reduce the value of other classes of stock or debt.97 
Theorists and practitioners who have studied these situations fre-
quently look to boards of directors as one of the institutional arrange-
ments that can mitigate the conflicts that such situations present. For ex-
ample, Wall Street lawyer and inventor of the “poison pill” defense 
against hostile takeovers, Martin Lipton, has long argued that managers 
and boards of directors need to be protected from shareholder activism in 
order to manage corporations for the long term.98 Harvard law professor 
Lucian Bebchuk, on the other hand, has made it a signature argument of 
                                                                                                             
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); 
Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984); Jeremy C. Stein, 
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. 
ECON. 655 (1989). 
 95. See MAYER, supra note 94; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) (arguing that actions taken by firms to 
benefit short-term shareholders can have value-reducing effects). 
 96. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33–65 (Alan J. Auerback ed., 1988) (argu-
ing that the gains to target shareholders in corporate takeovers may arise from the fact that the take-
over facilitates shareholder expropriation of firm-specific investments made by other corporate par-
ticipants, especially employees); MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) (arguing that employee in-
vestments in firm-specific assets are at risk in corporate enterprises along with financial capital). 
Blair and Stout’s work on team production theory fits most comfortably in this category, in that it 
argues that if boards are required to focus on share value maximization, this could inhibit the ability 
of the firm to elicit team-specific investments by team members. But the concept of the team produc-
tion problem is general enough to encompass the problem of asymmetric information, and the prob-
lem of the incentives for excess risk-taking. 
 97. See Douglas Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 
(2008); Simone Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. LAW 113 
(2010). Brian Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 
461, 471–80 (2010), models the situation in which one party to an investment benefits by pursuing a 
risky strategy, and the other benefits from pursuing a more conservative strategy. 
 98. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s 
Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003) (arguing that short-term share-
holders pressure companies to take actions that destroy economic value); Martin Lipton, The Many 
Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 733–58 (2007). 
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his career that shareholders need more power to prevent corporate man-
agers from using their power in ways that destroy shareholder value.99 
In recent years, however, law and finance scholars have been pursu-
ing both theoretical and empirical work examining the implication of 
these kinds of problems for corporate law. Some of this new work points 
to solutions that are remarkably similar to the solution suggested by Blair 
and Stout in their conception of a mediating hierarchy role for boards of 
directors. In this Part, I review some of this new empirical work, and in 
Part V, I highlight some interesting empirical findings that seem to sup-
port the mediating hierarchy solution. 
In an example of new scholarship on team production problems, or 
similar problems in corporate law, Robert Bartlett has written about what 
he calls the “horizontal” agency problem in corporations.100 The standard 
description of the agency problem thought to be at the core of corporate 
law refers to the problem that shareholders have in ensuring that manag-
ers act in their interests. Bartlett calls this familiar problem the “vertical” 
agency problem.101 In an important 2006 paper, however, Bartlett also 
observes that, in many firms, problems and conflicts can arise between 
different classes of investors, problems that he refers to as horizontal 
agency problems.102 These problems arise in firms financed with venture 
capital, for example, because venture capital financing typically occurs 
                                                 
 99. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 8974, 2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Fran-
chise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007). Prof. Bebchuk and Mr. Lipton have also engaged in a lively de-
bate on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, about 
whether boards of directors need more, or less protection from activist shareholders. See Lucian 
Bebchuk & Martin Lipton to Debate Blockholder Regulation, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/11/06/lucian-
bebchuk-and-martin-lipton-to-debate-blockholder-regulation/. 
 100. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 42 (2006). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See generally id. Bartlett notes that other scholars have discussed the potential for conflict 
among shareholders, citing Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (R. 
Morck ed., 2000); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Con-
trolling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003); and Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Sharehold-
ers and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 
(2006), among others. Id. Although he doesn’t use the language of “team production,” Bartlett’s 
analysis of the conflicts between different groups of investors in venture capital firms—his horizon-
tal agency problem—provides a vivid example of the kinds of problems that Blair and Stout had in 
mind in their 1999 article. 
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in stages, with venture capitalists (VCs) purchasing preferred shares in 
the initial round of venture capital financing, and subsequent investors 
purchasing different classes of preferred shares, often with preference in 
liquidation over some or all of the earlier classes, in later rounds of fi-
nancing.103 As finance theorists are well aware, there will always be a 
potential for conflict between the interests of different classes of securi-
ties holders if the various securities are all backed by the same cash 
flows of a firm, but they have different priorities in receiving dividends, 
or in liquidation, or different control rights.104 This means that, in many 
firms, there may be various classes of investors that each have different 
interests in the performance of the firm. As Bartlett points out, however, 
until very recently the legal and economic literature on venture capital 
firms ignored this problem and focused only on the vertical agency prob-
lem between venture capital investors and the founders or managers of 
the portfolio firm.105 
In his study of the horizontal agency problem, Bartlett works 
through examples of several firms in which the conflicts among different 
classes of investors came to a head during the years after the dot.com 
bubble collapsed in 2000 and 2001.106 The recurring problem in these 
incidents was that late round investors often received substantial control 
rights and preferences, especially if the firm was struggling somewhat or 
not yet making a profit at the time of the later financing. The rights and 
preferences of the newcomer could then be used in ways that harm early-
round investors if the firm gets into serious financial difficulty. Another 
common problem is that investors who have higher priority in liquidation 
are often eager to accept merger offers or refinancing transactions that 
protect their interests, but offer little or nothing to lower priority inves-
tors.107 
Bartlett seems to believe that these potential conflicts could be an-
ticipated and addressed effectively through terms in the corporate charter 
that specify rights and claims of various classes of securities that the firm 
                                                 
 103. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Meets the Real World: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUDS. 281, 313 (2003) (reporting 
that 94% of venture capital financings from 1987 through 1999 were done with preferred stock). 
 104. See, e.g., Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale 
of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384 (2010) (studying the conflict between investors in com-
mon stock and investors in preferred stock). 
 105. Bartlett, supra note 100, at 40, 41 n.9. 
 106. Id. at 81–95. When cash flows are high and growing, it is relatively easy to reconcile the 
potential conflicts among different investors, but when a firm suffers a setback, and cash flow is 
lower than expected, the potential conflicts often become serious actual conflicts. 
 107. This was the issue in In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
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can issue, or in the preferred share financing documents. He believes that 
for this to work, the courts must recognize the provisions in those docu-
ments as contractual in nature, and use contract interpretation rules in 
resolving subsequent disputes.108 While that might address the specific 
problems that arose in one case that he looked at, he recognizes that there 
is a larger issue here. “First,” he says, “the presence of both investor–
manager and interinvestor agency problems in VC investment suggests 
the need to reassess traditional analytical frameworks” that emphasize 
only the vertical agency problems.109 Second, “in addition to emphasiz-
ing the need to consider multidimensional agency problems in firms, VC 
finance also highlights the dynamic manner in which these problems can 
develop.”110 Bartlett is concerned with dynamic issues arising from the 
fact that contractual and institutional arrangements put in place at one 
stage in a corporation’s development, perhaps to mitigate and control 
vertical agency problems, can exacerbate the various conflicts among 
investors at a later time, especially when some investors come into the 
project later and on different terms. This implies, he says, that “[t]he ex-
istence within a single firm of both interstakeholder and intrastakeholder 
conflicts places renewed emphasis on the need for governance structures 
to resolve these conflicts as they arise.”111 
Another situation in which there is likely to be “horizontal” conflict 
among investors arises when a corporation gets into financial trouble. 
Again, investors that have higher priority in liquidation, such as credi-
tors, are likely to favor conservative actions that move quickly to liqui-
date assets and pay off debts, even if this would leave little or nothing 
left in the firm to distribute to investors with lower priority, such as 
common shareholders. If shareholders control firms, however, or if cor-
porate managers and directors are required to maximize share value, the 
firm may be more likely to take risky actions that can destroy value for 
high priority claimants, but make shareholders better off by giving them 
a shot at a higher return. Knowing this, creditors often negotiate for con-
                                                 
 108. Bartlett is especially critical of the Delaware Court’s decision in Benchmark Capital 
Partners IV, L.P., v. Vague, No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff'd 
sub nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Fin. Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003) be-
cause the court applied common law rules of corporate law, rather than contract law, to resolve the 
dispute, having the effect of wiping out some of the protections that Benchmark Capital thought it 
had bargained for. Bartlett, supra note 100, at 101 (“A primary failure of the Benchmark opinion—
and of Delaware corporate jurisprudence in general—is the refusal to apply ordinary contract princi-
ples in interpreting the terms of preferred stock rights.”). 
 109. Id. at 108. 
 110. Id. at 111. 
 111. Id. at 47. 
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trol rights to protect their interests. Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen 
have written extensively about the fact that these arrangements often 
mean that creditors play a significant role in corporate governance, one 
that, in the past, tended to be overlooked by corporate law scholars.112 
Michelle Harner has similarly explored how activist distressed debt in-
vestors often take positions in the debt securities of a firm in financial 
difficulty with the intention of using the control rights they obtain 
through their debt claims to influence or control the restructuring pro-
cess.113 In this way, they are sometimes able to acquire a position as a 
creditor for pennies on the dollar, and then parlay their holdings into a 
position as a major shareholder in the restructured company. The con-
flicts that must be resolved along the way are more likely to be horizon-
tal conflicts, among various classes of investors, rather than the more 
thoroughly studied conflicts between investors and managers.114 
When a corporation is in financial trouble, or even if it just has a 
high level of debt relative to its total assets, there will inevitably be con-
flicts between what is in the interest of creditors, and what is in the inter-
est of employees, trade creditors, or shareholders. Bartlett might call the-
se situations “horizontal agency problems,” but they could also be de-
scribed as team production problems—each group of participants has 
made some contribution to the wealth generating capacity of the corpora-
tion. A valuation may or may not have been put on these prior contribu-
tions at the time they were made, but those valuations may be irrelevant 
or only marginally relevant when considering what participants should 
get in a liquidation or restructuring. If the corporation is restructured and 
will continue in business, however, the organizers of the restructured 
firm will need to work out some arrangement by which the key players 
stay on board and work together going forward. Even if the firm is going 
                                                 
 112. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751 (2002) (proposing private ordering solutions to the intra-investor disputes that arise in bankrupt-
cy); See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) (discussing the covenants and other strate-
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 113. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of 
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 114. Id. at 709 (the investment goals of distressed debt investors “may or may not align with 
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to be liquidated and wound up, the parties may still be better off if they 
can find a way to resolve the conflicts among the various claimants out-
side of bankruptcy court. 
Simone Sepe has suggested that these problems could be modeled 
as “common agency” problems, using the framework developed by 
Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston for thinking about problems in 
which an agent is responsible to multiple principals.115 “A common 
agency problem arises when a single agent performs tasks on behalf of 
several independent principals who have divergent preferences,” Sepe 
explains.116 Examples include a sales agent representing a number of cli-
ents and selling a variety of products, some of which may compete with 
each other, or a government agency that is supposed to pursue multiple 
objectives. This model, Sepe asserts, “can be applied to describe manag-
ers as common agents of several types of investors (e.g., principals), in-
cluding both controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and credi-
tors.”117 
Sepe offers two reasons why we should think of corporate manag-
ers as common agents: “First, investors of all types rely on managers . . . 
for fulfilment of their investment expectations”; and second, the common 
agency model “captures the complexity of corporate agency problems, 
allowing for consideration of both the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of such problems.”118 
Although Bartlett, Baird and Rasmussen, and Harner have explored 
such issues primarily in the context of firm financial distress, Sepe ob-
serves that the problem of the vulnerability of noncommon equity inves-
tors (NCE investors) to corporate actions designed to maximize share 
value is not limited to firms in financial distress.119 The problem exists, 
he says, for all firms that have a low net worth, asset volatility, severe 
asymmetric information problems, and a high degree of specificity of 
investment120—a description that applies to most venture capital firms as 
well as to firms in financial distress. 
Sepe has argued that one solution to the problem that is becoming 
more commonly deployed, is the appointment of directors to corporate 
boards who are explicitly supposed to represent the interests of NCE in-
                                                 
 115. Sepe, supra note 97, at 113; B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common 
Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923, 923–42 (1986). 
 116. Sepe, supra note 97, at 116. 
 117. Id. 
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 119. See Simone E. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 309 (2013). 
 120. Id. at 332. 
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vestors whose investments are at risk in the enterprise.121 He cites as ex-
amples the common practice on boards of firms funded by venture capi-
tal of having some directors who explicitly represent the interest of the 
venture capitalists, who frequently hold preferred shares rather than 
common shares.122 Other examples he offers include the appointment of 
directors representing workers or unions when workers agree to wage 
and benefit cuts during financial restructuring, and the appointment of 
directors representing the United States Treasury onto boards of compa-
nies that received bailout money from the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram, more commonly known as TARP.123 
A major problem with this solution, however, is that recent deci-
sions of the Delaware courts seem to say that such directors owe fiduci-
ary duties only to common shareholders, regardless of whether they were 
selected to represent some other interest.124 Sepe suggests that having 
directors on boards to explicitly represent competing interests is an ef-
fort, on the part of the corporate participants, to try to anticipate horizon-
tal agency/team production issues, and to develop their own contracts or 
other “private ordering” solutions to them.125 But if so, it is important 
that courts respect the solutions they devise, even when that means that 
the individuals on boards of directors must be able to advocate for the 
party they represent and weigh competing interests in making decisions. 
This solution sounds very similar to the mediating hierarchy solution 
described by Blair and Stout. 
Brian Broughman also studies startup firms and venture capital 
firms, and considers the arrangements that such firms often make to deal 
with the fact that both the entrepreneurs/managers of the firm and the 
venture capitalist investors have investments at risk, and all need a gov-
ernance tool that can allow them to balance and protect both sets of in-
terests.126 Broughman models the relationship between two parties in-
volved together in a single firm, an entrepreneur and a VC, in which the 
entrepreneur holds common stock and the VC holds preferred stock. Be-
cause the parties have different cash flow rights in the firm, they are like-
ly to have different preferences over certain strategic decisions, such as 
whether to undertake a new risky project, or sell the firm, or seek a new 
round of financing that will dilute the interest of one or both parties and 
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 124. Id. at 344–45 & nn.140–42. 
 125. Id. at 336–39. 
 126. Broughman, supra note 97, at 510. 
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have priority over the preferred stock owner. In Broughman’s model, the 
VC consistently prefers the more conservative choices that protect its 
fixed claim, whereas the entrepreneur tends to prefer riskier strategies 
that have a chance at creating substantial new value for the common 
stock, even if the strategies reduce the value of fixed or high priority 
claims by making them more risky.127 In his model, Broughman assumes 
that the choice of strategy is determined by whether the entrepreneur 
controls the board, in which case the risky strategy will be chosen, or the 
VC controls the board, in which case the conservative strategy will be 
chosen.128 Prior research on these sorts of problems has tended to assume 
that there are only two choices of strategies, with no possibility of com-
promise in which both parties get some benefits, even if it is not their 
ideal outcome.129 Additionally, research has assumed that the decision 
must be controlled by one of the two parties.130 Given these assumptions, 
the parties may be unable to reach the most efficient outcome—the one 
that maximizes the total value created by the firm—even though the par-
ties could both be made better off if they could maximize total value and 
then share the gains.131 
Broughman shows, however, that the parties can achieve the social-
ly optimal outcome if the decision can be assigned to a board consisting 
of three people: one representing the entrepreneur, one representing the 
VC, and an independent director who is explicitly recruited to the board 
to be a neutral player who casts the deciding vote in the case of any disa-
greements.132 Broughman calls this player the “ID-arbitrator.”133 The rea-
son this system works is not because the ID-arbitrator is assumed to be 
smarter or a better bargainer. It is because choices of actions proposed by 
the entrepreneur and the VC will have a tendency to converge to the so-
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 133. Id. at 474. 
326 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:297 
cially optimal level if they both know that the ID-arbitrator will choose 
from the actions proposed by the two parties. Broughman explains: 
Under ID-arbitration, the entrepreneur and VC anticipate how the 
independent director is likely to vote if a conflict should arise. This 
knowledge affects the strategies that the entrepreneur and the VC 
will propose ex ante. There is no point in proposing a strategy that 
will be rejected by the independent director, as this would effective-
ly let the other party select the firm’s course of action. Instead the 
parties have an incentive to offer a strategic compromise—a pro-
posal that is likely to be endorsed by the independent director and 
yet is still acceptable to the proposing party.134 
The solution to Broughman’s model is based on solutions worked 
out for models of “final-offer arbitration”135 and models of candidates for 
election who must appeal to the median voter.136 Broughman discusses 
empirical evidence showing that, in the context of startup firms and ven-
ture capital financed firms, the most common pattern of the composition 
of the boards of directors is that neither representatives of the VCs nor 
representatives of the entrepreneurs/managers control the board of direc-
tors of the firm by having a majority of board seats. Instead, each side 
will hold less than half the seats, and one or two individuals, chosen 
jointly by the parties explicitly to be neutral decisionmakers, will hold 
the deciding vote on the board.137 
Broughman distinguishes his theory of independent directors on 
corporate boards from the team production theory laid out by Blair and 
Stout in 1999 because, he notes, Blair and Stout explicitly asserted that 
their theory applied to the boards of publicly traded corporations, and not 
to closely held corporations.138 Nonetheless, Broughman’s model and his 
theory capture exactly the same intuition that Blair and Stout were trying 
to express—the participants in an enterprise where there are team pro-
duction, or horizontal agency, problems need “a mechanism that allows 
both parties to commit to nonopportunistic behavior.”139 The requirement 
in corporate law that corporations have boards of directors can be such a 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 482. 
 135. Id. at 482 (citing Vincent P. Crawford, On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes, 87 J. POL. 
ECON. 131, 131–32 (1979)); Daniel R. Marburger, Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitra-
tion: Evidence from Major League Baseball, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 60, 60–62 (2004). 
 136. Broughman, supra note 97, at 482 (citing Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Polit-
ical Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135 (1957)); ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTION 25–27 (2000). 
 137. Broughman, supra note 97, at 489–91. 
 138. Id. at 501. 
 139. Id. at 480. 
2015] Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs 327 
mechanism, especially if directors are chosen for their general thought-
fulness and independence, not only from management, but from any of 
the powerful interests at stake in the firm. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
At the time that Blair and Stout were writing their “team produc-
tion” article, they focused on publicly traded corporations. The primary 
evidence they brought to bear on the theory that one job of boards of di-
rectors is to be mediating hierarchs was court cases that give boards wide 
discretion to consider many competing interests.140 In a 2001 article, 
however, Blair and Stout suggested that a good place to look for direct 
evidence was in venture capital firms as they go public.141 At the time, 
there was a smattering of scholarly evidence that, in fact, when venture 
capital firms go public, they often have a board structure in which neither 
the entrepreneur/managers, nor the VCs, have control: 
Academic studies of firms planning an initial public offering show 
that even though outside investors (e.g., venture capital firms) may 
often hold majority blocks of stock, at the time the firm goes public 
the board is structured so that neither the block investors nor the 
firm’s founders make up a majority of the seats on the board. “Inde-
pendent” directors who are neither part of management, nor repre-
sentatives of the venture capitalists, typically hold enough votes to 
determine the outcome of any dispute between the entrepreneur and 
the venture capitalist. In a recent working paper, Stephen Choi ar-
gues that this structure is designed to reassure the firm’s  entrepre-
neurs and employees on the one hand, and its contributors of finan-
cial capital on the other, that neither side can readily manage the 
firm in a fashion detrimental to the other.142 
Research by Julia Liebeskind had found a similar phenomenon in a 
sample of seventy-nine biotechnology startup firms in California, found-
ed between 1974 and 1995.143 Since then, a much larger body of evi-
dence has been developed that expands on this point. A 2003 article by 
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Steven Kaplan and Per Stromberg,144 in which the authors study 213 ven-
ture capital investments in 119 portfolio companies,145 found that in 
60.7% of the observations in their data,146 neither the found-
er/entrepreneur, nor the VC controlled a majority of seats on the board. 
Over the whole sample, VCs controlled 41.4% of the board seats, the 
founder controlled 35.4% of the board seats, and outsiders, whom the 
authors say were “mutually agreed upon by the VCs and the found-
ers/entrepreneurs,” held the remaining 23.2% of seats.147 In practice, this 
meant that neither founders nor VCs could unilaterally make important 
strategic decisions. For any decision that required a vote of a majority of 
the directors, if they could not get the support of the other party, they 
would have to at least get the support of the outsider. 
Broughman cites the Kaplan and Stromberg findings in support of 
his theory and, in addition, examines data on fifty-four VC-backed firms 
in Silicon Valley that had a total of 154 rounds of funding, and that were 
sold to an acquirer in 2003 or 2004.148 He finds that “a startup board has 
an average of 5.5 directors (the first round board is slightly smaller). . . . 
VCs hold on average 43.9% of the board seats, entrepreneurs hold 33%, 
and the remaining board seats, 23.1% of the total, are held by independ-
ent directors.”149 Broughman also categorizes the boards in his sample by 
whether they are controlled by the VC, controlled by the entrepreneur, 
deadlocked (each party holds 50% of the seats), or what he calls “arbitra-
tion” boards with independent directors holding the deciding vote in any 
dispute between the VC and the entrepreneur.150 He finds that in 64.3% 
of his observations (financing rounds), the boards appear to be structured 
for an arbitration approach to decisionmaking.151 Broughman also finds 
evidence that the right to select directors to particular positions on the 
board is a right that is bargained for when the terms of the financing 
agreement are being worked out, but that the independent directors must 
be approved by both parties.152 Interviews that Broughman conducted 
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confirmed that “the parties consulted each other and made sure everyone 
approved the directors selected.”153 
Elizabeth Pollman has also researched the questions of what boards 
of directors of venture capital-funded corporations look like and how 
they function.154 She finds data that show that 
In the early stages of the corporation, the board is often composed 
of three to five directors total, representing one to two management 
seats, one to three VC seats, and zero to two independent seats. 
Through the later stages of the startup corporation, the board typi-
cally increases to between five to seven directors, representing one 
to two management seats, two to three VC seats, and two to three 
independent seats.155 
She also finds that, in the professional literature discussing board compo-
sition and addressing the startup and venture capital community, there is 
widespread discussion to the effect that it is useful to have independent 
directors on boards and of the idea that neither the VC nor the found-
er/entrepreneur should control the board.156 In particular, there is exten-
sive discussion of the independent directors doing what one practitioner 
calls “constructive mediation.”157 
Another body of empirical evidence may provide a kind of “dog 
that didn’t bark” support for the idea that boards of directors serve a me-
diating function. This is the curious fact that, in hundreds of empirical 
studies of the impact that various configurations and characteristics of 
boards of directors have on the performance of corporations, almost no 
consistent patterns have emerged.158 Board composition and structure 
does not seem to affect the financial performance of corporations, except 
in one very limited respect: the presence of independent directors on 
boards, especially if they serve on audit committees, is associated with 
reduced incidence of financial or accounting misbehavior.159 Outside of 
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that, the evidence is very mixed about the impact that board independ-
ence or other characteristics have on performance.160 
Why might this be? If an important function of boards of directors 
is to serve a mediating function, we would expect that, if they are doing 
this job well, their impact will be mostly invisible. The reason is twofold. 
First, as Broughman argues, when mediating, members of a board are 
going to make the call between two factions, and both factions have 
strong incentives to moderate their demands.161 They are generally both 
better off if they can reach a strategic compromise. Thus, it may appear 
to all concerned that there is no conflict. The second reason is that medi-
ating directors will only be called upon to actually make the decision in 
cases that involve an exceptionally high level of conflict that can’t be 
resolved at a lower level.162 In such cases, the issue that the mediating 
directors must decide likely involves making complex and difficult trade-
offs, the outcome of which is uncertain as it is unclear what actions or 
choices will maximize share value, or achieve any other corporate goal. 
The issues are “close calls.” As a result, the actions or policies chosen by 
the mediating directors will probably deviate more or less randomly from 
some hypothetical set of optimal choices. In other words, the decisions 
that mediating directors make will not be a random sample of all deci-
sions—they will be only the hardest cases. In those situations, if the me-
diator is unbiased and not aligned with one side or the other with respect 
to the issue under consideration, those decisions will not systematically 
favor one side or the other. Following the logic of Priest and Klein in 
their analysis of the selection of disputes for litigation,163 the result might 
be that we cannot expect to find a correlation between the presence of a 
mediating board, and various measures of corporate performance.164 
IV. DELAWARE MAY BE REJECTING THE MEDIATING BOARD  
Delaware courts have always insisted that directors must act “in the 
best interest of the corporation,” and sometimes “in the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders.” In decisions going back decades, 
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however, they have historically granted wide discretion for boards of 
directors who make choices for their corporations that are designed to 
balance competing interests. In recent years, however, the Delaware 
courts have handed down a number of decisions that seem to tie direc-
tors’ hands more tightly to the task of acting for the sole benefit of com-
mon shareholders. Sepe dates the apparent shift in Delaware doctrine to 
the 2009 decision of the Chancery Court in In re Trados, Inc. Sharehold-
er Litigation (Trados I), a decision which Sepe called “pathbreaking.”165 
In its decision, the Chancery Court denied a motion to dismiss sought by 
directors of a VC-financed corporation, Trados, Inc.166 Directors had 
made a decision to sell the company in a merger transaction for a price 
that provided a payout to preferred shares and almost covered their liqui-
dation preferences, but provided nothing for the common shareholders.167 
A holder of common shares sued.168 Five of the seven directors of 
Trados, Inc. that had made the decision were representatives of venture 
capital firms that held preferred shares in the company.169 They sought to 
have the case dismissed on various grounds and even argued that they 
believed that they were acting in the best interest of the corporation.170 In 
denying the motion, the Chancery Court said: 
[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary 
judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common 
stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to 
the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of pre-
ferred stock, where there is a conflict.171 
Similarly, in eBay Domestic Holding, Inc. v. Newmark, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court said that directors are required to seek “to promote 
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”172 In this 
case, eBay was a minority shareholder in craigslist, Inc., a very closely 
held corporation in which Craig Newmark and James Buckmaster, the 
founders and top executives in craigslist, were the only other sharehold-
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ers and the only members of the board of directors. When eBay initiated 
its classified ads website, Kijiji, which competed with craigslist, 
Newmark and Buckmaster took several actions on the part of craigslist 
designed to prevent eBay from being able to either elect a director to the 
board, or acquire more shares of craigslist, or even sell its holdings to 
another investor.173 In its decision, the court observed that craigslist, 
“[t]hough a for-profit concern . . . largely operates its business as a com-
munity service.”174 While the court found that Newmark and Buckmaster 
had a legitimate competitive concern about eBay being able to elect a 
director, they could not use the corporate machinery to prevent eBay 
from being able to enjoy other benefits of its ownership interest. The 
court explained: 
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an organ-
ization seeking to aid local, national, and global communities by 
providing a website for online classifieds . . . . The corporate form 
in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle 
for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other 
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment. . . . 
[Newmark and Buckmaster] opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-
profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of 
dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became a 
stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the 
craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to pro-
mote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers.175  
In North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, 
Inc. v. Gheewalla,176 decided in 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court set-
tled an issue that scholars had been debating for a number of years: 
whether directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when a corporation is 
“in the zone of insolvency.”177 This issue rose to prominence after former 
Chancellor William Allen raised the possibility in Credit Lyonnaise Bank 
Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.178 In Gheewalla, the 
court found that when a corporation is insolvent, creditors may have 
standing to pursue a derivative action against the board of directors for 
                                                 
 173. Id. at 6. 
 174. Id. at 8. 
 175. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). 
 176. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
 177. Id. at 99. See id. at n.28 for an extensive list of the literature discussing this question. 
 178. Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
2015] Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs 333 
breach of their fiduciary duties, but they still would not have a direct 
cause of action: 
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, 
the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must 
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best inter-
ests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.179 
Most recently, in the summer of 2013, the Delaware Chancery 
Court published its decision in In re Trados, Inc., Shareholder Litigation 
(Trados II),180 in which the court reiterated the point it made in its deci-
sion on the motion to dismiss in this same case, discussed above, about 
the duty of the board to prefer the interest of the common shareholders to 
the interest of other security holders.181 As if to pound the point home, 
Vice Chancellor Laster specifically engaged the scholarly literature on 
whether corporate directors should focus on “enterprise value” rather 
than just shareholder value,182 and repeated his point in five separate 
places in the opinion.183 In the most extended statement of the point, he 
says: 
[T]he standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive in 
good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its contractu-
                                                 
 179. Gheewala, 930 A.2d 92, at 101. 
 180. In re Trados, Inc., S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 181. Id. at 63–64. 
 182. Id. at note 16 (citing Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006)); Baird & Henderson, supra note 97; William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013). 
 183. Trados II, 73 A.3d at 20 (“Directors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and its stockholders which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maxim-
ize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants.”); id. at 46–47 (“When exer-
cising their statutory responsibility, the standard of conduct requires that directors seek ‘to promote 
the value of the corporation for the benefit if its stockholders.’”) (footnote omitted, but citing eBay, 
and Gheewala, among others); id. at 48 (citing other prior cases which the court says “capture . . . 
the foundational relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit 
of the entity’s residual claimants. Nevertheless, ‘stockholders’ best interest must always, within legal 
limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be considered only instrumentally to advance that 
end.”); id. at 49 (“Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital. In terms of the standard of con-
duct, the duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over 
the long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with per-
petual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment. When deciding whether 
to pursue a strategic alternative that would end or fundamentally alter the stockholders’ ongoing 
investment in the corporation, the loyalty-based standard of conduct requires that the alternative 
yield value exceeding what the corporation otherwise would generate for stockholders over the long-
term.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 63–64 (as cited in text infra). 
334 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:297 
al claimants. In light of this obligation, it is the duty of directors to 
pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common share-
holders, if that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises 
owed to the preferred. . . . This principle is not unique to preferred 
stock; it applies equally to other holders of contract rights against 
the corporation. Consequently . . . in circumstances where the inter-
ests of common stockholders diverge from those of the preferred 
stockholders, it is possible that a director could breach her duty by 
improperly favoring the interests of the preferred stockholders over 
those of the common stockholders.184 
One can quibble about the extent to which the decisions in these 
cases are limited to the special facts—in both Trados and eBay, the facts 
involved closely held corporations in which controlling shareholders 
were accused, in effect, of squeezing out the noncontrolling shareholders 
and depriving them of the benefits of ownership of their shares.185 This is 
the same context in which most of the clear statements of courts about 
the importance of maximizing value for shareholders is stressed.186 Leo 
Strine, however, is now the Chief Justice and in his scholarly writings he 
has increasingly adopted a view that is consistent with the pronounce-
ments by Vice Chancellor Laster about the importance of focusing on the 
benefit to common shareholders.187 One effect of these decisions, Sepe 
worries, is that Delaware courts are more strictly enforcing the duty of 
undivided loyalty, “virtually depriving constituency directors of any ef-
fective role.”188 The courts may also make it more difficult in the future 
for boards to play a mediating role that might otherwise be an important 
private ordering solution to the team production problem in their firms. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Scholarship on the idea of a mediating function for boards of direc-
tors of corporations has, in recent years, suggested that participants in 
corporations may prefer to choose an arrangement in which 
decisionmaking is delegated to an independent and unbiased board as a 
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private ordering solution to problems that have the characteristics of 
team production problems. Such characteristics include productive ac-
tivity that requires complex, difficult to measure, and difficult to contract 
inputs; inputs that must come from a number of participants; and an out-
put of the productive activity that is “nonseparable,” in that it is not pos-
sible to determine ex post what portion of the output was produced by 
each participant. These characteristics make it difficult or impossible to 
write contracts with team members, which provide incentives for them to 
fully contribute, while also adequately protecting the team-specific in-
vestments they make in pursuing the enterprise. The delegation of key 
decision rights to a “mediating hierarchy” is one solution to this problem. 
Blair and Stout, in 1999, argued that the laws governing decisionmaking 
by boards of directors in publicly traded corporations are more consistent 
with a mediating function than with a requirement that directors must 
maximize share value. Since then, a growing body of evidence suggests 
that in many private corporations, board structures are being chosen ex-
plicitly so that independent directors can carry out a mediating function. 
The Demoulas Supermarkets board, at one point, was apparently 
structured in this way, with two representatives of each side of the family 
on the board, as well as three individuals chosen by majority vote of all 
shareholders, three who, in theory, were supposed to be unaligned.189 
Such arrangements can be fragile, however, if the “independent” direc-
tors are not truly unaligned. Until recently, the Arthur T. side of the fami-
ly controlled the selection of the three independent members, because 
one member of the Arthur S. side who controlled 5.5% of the shares vot-
ed with the Arthur T. side, thereby tipping the balance slightly in favor of 
Arthur T.190 All was not peace and light under that arrangement, as tran-
scripts from board meetings obtained by the Boston Globe reveal.191 Ar-
thur S. and the board member appointees from his side of the family con-
tinually challenged Arthur T.’s authority to enter into sizeable real estate 
transactions without approval from the board, and were generally fearful 
and distrustful that the Arthur S. side of the family was being taken ad-
vantage of. Nonetheless, as one observer noted, the stores stayed open, 
the employees went to work, and the customers came.192 In the summer 
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of 2013, the shareholder from the Arthur S. side who had been voting 
with the Arthur T. side switched sides.193 The result was that, within a 
year, according to news accounts about the family feud, there was “a 
shake-up on the board of directors . . . which led to a controversial $300 
million special payout to family shareholders, and ultimately, the oust-
er . . . of popular CEO and 40-year employee Arthur T. Demoulas.”194 
There was so much bad blood between the two branches of the clan that 
the stalemate threatened to completely destroy the firm, causing the gov-
ernors of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to jointly engage with both 
sides to try to get them to come to an agreement.195 The governors openly 
appealed to both sides to end the dispute so that employees could get 
back to work and customers could return to shop at the store they appar-
ently loved. The story has not yet come out about what exactly the two 
governors did, but the theory of mediating boards examined in this Arti-
cle suggests that they would not have had to do much—the mere fact that 
they were unaligned may have been what was needed to get each of the 
sides to moderate their demands. On August 27, 2014, the parties 
reached an agreement, by which the Arthur T. side will buy out the Ar-
thur S. side in late 2014 or early 2015, and Arthur T. returned to work as 
CEO of the company.196 
There is no doubt that the Market Basket story is unusual in many 
respects, but the basic scenario of joint participants in a corporate enter-
prise—team members—contending with each other over how the wealth 
created by the corporation will be divided up is not. In these situations, 
decisionmaking by trusted intermediaries can help keep the team func-
tioning together. 
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